Is NATO a Boon or a Bane for International Relations?

Celebrating NATO's 75th Anniversary.

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Amongst a non-negligible group of academics, ex-diplomats and experts, the idea that NATO is responsible for the war in Ukraine is gaining traction and attracting a lot of attention across social media. This reflects the Russian point of view, with Putin clearly placing the blame on NATO and more specifically on "NATO expansion" for his "military operation" in Ukraine. False parallels are made relative to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, seeking to demonstrate that the presence of NATO on its borders is an existential threat to Russia.

It is important to demonstrate that this theory is incorrect and does not in any way reflect reality, in particular since pro-Russian extreme far-right parties in Europe are picking up on this theory to justify their opposition to helping Ukraine in the future.

Before having a closer look at the facts, it is interesting to note that vocabulary and terminology also is relevant in this context. Nato "expansion" has taken on a more aggressive and negative connotation, whereas what actually happened, i.e. NATO "enlargement" is avoided. It is interesting to note that the term "EU enlargement" is never referred to as "EU Expansion", or far less so. The enlargement of the EU and of NATO are closely interdependent.

One of the main arguments of the "NATO is the big bad wolf" theory, is that the seed of conflict was sowed at the very beginning with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of West and East Germany. Apparently, at the time, the US committed that none of the Eastern European countries would ever be admitted into NATO except for East Germany following its reunification with West Germany.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, German reunification was unavoidable and became reality on October 3rd 1990 with the immediate consequence of East Germany withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, which dissolved in 1991. As a matter of historical fact, "The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany" was signed in Moscow in September 1990, between East Germany, West Germany, the USSR, the United States, France and the United Kingdom and at no point during the negotiations for this treaty or in the immediate aftermath, was the question of the enlargement to the East of NATO ever mentioned, let alone discussed. The only reference to NATO concerned the fact that East Germany as part of a new reunified Germany would be part of NATO, but it was also agreed that no NATO troops would be stationed in the previous territories of East Germany.

One of the most vocal proponents of the NATO expansion theory discussed in this article, is an ex-ambassador to the Soviet Union who notably states in one of his declarations "I was there" during the negotiations to end the Cold War, implying that as a first-hand witness, he can attest to the existence of this formal pledge. Notwithstanding that other members of the US government at the time, notably Secretary of State Baker, denied this fact, one of the main participants and indeed signatories of the final treaty contradicted the afore-mentioned allegation.

In an October 2014 interview, Mikhail Gorbachev declared :

"The topic of “NATO expansion” was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years. I say this with full responsibility. Not a singe Eastern European country raised the issue, not even after the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991. Western leaders didn’t bring it up, either.” 

The second main argument advanced by the pro-Russia camp is the fact that the US and by extension the US actively and "aggressively" sought to "drag" Eastern European countries into NATO.

Once again, a wee bit of historical verity has to be injected into the discussion at this juncture. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War was not just a blip on the screen of regular current events, that had little or no impact on the course of history. It was a major, significant event that was one of the most far-reaching and consequential events of the 20th century. Some would argue that it was the final act of the Second World War. Others famously argued that it was the end of history. Hyperbole aside, it is undeniable that the geopolitical situation in Europe at the beginning of the 1990s was unique and presented both immense hope to a large number of people who had lived under communist regimes for over 40 years and who finally had the opportunity to taste the fruits of democracy, but also instability as a vacuum was created after the fall of the USSR. The NATO Secretary General at the time, General Manfred Wörner, stated in 1993 :

"The collapse of Soviet Communism has left us with a paradox: there is less threat, but also less peace".

The newly free Eastern European countries such as Poland were able for the first time since decades to plan for their own future and decide for themselves their foreign and security related policy. To take the example of Poland, which is very much an example of how the former communist Eastern European countries thought, President Lech Wałęsa was very adamant and vocal in pushing for the integration of Poland into Western Europe, meaning both the European Union but also NATO. This was a clear decision and desire expressed by the freely, democratically elected government of Poland. On the American side, the much regretted Madeleine Albright understood more than others the situation in Eastern Europe, as the daughter of a former Czechoslovak diplomat who was forced to flee Europe to the US after the Second World War. Soviet control and domination was not a theoretical concept for Albright.

The post-cold war power vacuum led to serious conflict in the Balkans with the break-up of the ex-Yugoslavian Republics; resulting, amongst other atrocities and war crimes, in ethnic cleansing and genocide at Srebrenica in 1995. As Werner had said, "less threat" but also "less peace".

NATO played an important role in ending the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia and in securing the Dayton Peace Accords. The impact of this terrible war cannot be underestimated and was further justification for former communist countries in Eastern Europe to seek a stable, prosperous and secure future within the European family, primarily the European Union. The EU enlargement was conducted in parallel to NATO enlargement but took longer in terms of making sure that the candidate countries had initiated and conducted the necessary reforms to be able to qualify for accession. At the same time, during the 1990s, Ukraine gave several security guarantees to Russia and had notably repatriated all nuclear weapons to Russia.

No one can reasonably deny that the desire to join the European Union and the quest for security and stability by joining NATO were first and foremost the choices of the Eastern European countries themselves, very far from the idea of being coerced to join, or being "dragged into NATO" for the sole reason of threatening Russia.

Russia was also undergoing major change, first under the tumultuous presidency of Boris Yeltsin and then at the turn of the century with the nomination as Prime Minister and then as President of a former KGB Agent who had spent most of his career in East Germany, a certain Vladimir Putin.

Russia was confronted with its own internal territorial issues, most visible in the Caucuses with the first Chechen war from 1994 to 1996 which simmered on until a further eruption of violence in the Second Chechen war starting in 1999. In September of that year, a series of apartment bombings in Moscow in 1999 killed over 200 people and were blamed on Chechen terrorists, reigniting the conflict and the Second Chechen war. Further terrorist attacks took place in the following years, such as the attack on the Dubrovka theatre in 2002 and the Beslan school in 2004.

The then prime minister Vladimir Putin gained popularity by successfully prosecuting the second war in Chechnya and the related terror campaign conducted in Russia, allowing him to accede to the presidency in March 2000. Putin had been named a year earlier as director of the successor the KGB organisation, the FSB and these close links have led to much speculation and subsequent supporting evidence that the terror campaign in September 1999 in Moscow was, in fact, initiated, organised and implemented by the FSB and Putin as a way to consolidate his power and seize the presidency.

It is worthwhile to emphasise the advent to power of Putin and the consolidation of his power over the past 25 years. In true Russian autocratic manner, he has been a master in securing his grasp on power and has never ceased to increase his authority and control over the years; be it by playing with the Constitution to let one of his acolytes (Medvedev) serve as President for a term, whilst he was the all powerful Prime Minister, or be it be increasingly strangling the freedom of expression in Russia by implementing the so-called foreign agent laws, not to mention the State sanctioned assassination of journalists, opponents and "enemies of the State" both in Russia and abroad.

A part of his plan, Putin has remodelled and rewritten history to justify his power. It was only in 2007 at the Munich Security Conference that he for the first time complained about NATO expansion. Up to then, it was not part of his repertoire. Coincidentally or not, he invaded Georgia in 2008 and clearly expressed, for the first time, military ambitions outside of Russia. The resulting ceasefire, mediated by then French President Nicolas Sarkozy, gave control to Russia of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, control that remains to this day.

The timid reaction of the West was so muted and accommodating that Russia suffered very little, if any, international consequences. The new Obama administration and the European countries had no desire or interest in escalating the conflict and, on the contrary, were perfectly willing and happy to engage in a clear policy of appeasement believing, falsely, that this would prevent any further conflict in the future. De facto, the international community was accepting that Russia was allowed to interfere, militarily if needs be, into a newly accepted "sphere of influence".

As Master of Disaster, Putin was proving that this new-found approach to the West was bearing unexpected and tangible fruits, and he was naturally incentivised to continue along the same path, albeit increasing substantially the stakes.

The Russo-Georgian War also demonstrated to NATO that it was incapable of securing the safety of its new partners, most notably the Baltic States, who had joined NATO in March 2004. In the eventuality of a Russian attack on the Baltic States, NATO would not have been able to defend them, and this was a stark warning to NATO that it was time to put the concept of "collective defence" at the top of the list of priorities for the organisation.

Putin, in line with his new foreign policy, stated that one of the main reasons why he had invaded Georgia was because NATO had accepted the principle of Georgia becoming a NATO member at the famous Bucharest Conference in April 2008, following the expressed wishes of the Georgian government, when and only when all conditions had been met. Even if this explanation were to be accepted at face value, it would have been a clear violation of international law to invade a neighbouring country as a pre-emptive act to deny the said country's desire to join NATO in the distant future. It also has to be mentioned that Putin justified the invasion of Georgia by falsely accusing the Georgian government of "genocide" and "aggression against South Ossetia".

With hindsight, the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008 marks the transition from a period of post Soviet cooperation between Russia and the West and a new Cold War.

The attempts of the West to incorporate Russia into an international collective security framework had demonstrably failed, but nonetheless the West did not recognise this important paradigm shift and continued to persist in treating Russia as a strategic partner rather than an adversary (hence the doomed policy of "reset" of Hillary Clinton and President Obama).

Only after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the proxy-war initiated by Russia in Eastern Ukraine, did attitudes in the West start to change, albeit very slowly at first. During the "Revolution of Dignity" or "The Maidan Revolution" of February 2014, Putin took advantage of the unrest in Kyiv to occupy Crimea with special forces without insignia, before formally annexing it on March 16th with the organisation of a bogus referendum.

The Maidan Revolution was triggered by the decision of the pro-Russian President no to ratify a resolution of the Ukrainian Parliament that had overwhelmingly accepted to sign a free trade and association agreement with the EU. Pro-Russian President Yanukovych advocated stronger ties with Russia and refused to follow the Parliament's decision and subsequently popular protest broke out, finally resulting with Yanukovych's destitution by Parliament on February 22nd and his fleeing to Moscow immediately thereafter.

The invasion and annexation of Crimea was a direct conse-quence of the Maidan Revolution and the destitution of the pro-Kremlin Ukaranian pesident.

Putin explained in great detail that Crimea was historically part of Russia, an argument and a re-writing of history that he would continuously develop and detail further over the following years. He naturally glosses over the terrible suffering inflicted on Ukrainian populations during Soviet time, (the Holodomor). The interview he gave to Tucker Carlson recently is the best example of Putin's scandalous propaganda, not only relative to Ukrainian history but regarding his view on the origin of the Second World War as a whole.

After the events of 2014 and the proxy war in Eastern Ukraine, Putin managed the tour de force to be seen as a mediator in the conflict and not a participant. Following Ukrainian defeats on the battlefield, Putin was able to "freeze" the conflict in a favourable position for Russia and its separatists allies, forcing the West to recognise the status quo as illustrated in the Minsk I and more importantly, Minsk II Agreements concluded in 2015.

The full invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022, is the topic of many discussions as to the timing and scope thereof. The presumptive Republican nominee for the forthcoming Presidential election in the US, Donald Trump, constantly trumpets the fact that Putin would never have invaded Ukraine under his watch. Notwithstanding that, when he was president, he did nothing to push back on the annexation of Crimea or even attempt to dissuade Putin from taking further action. One can only imagine that Trump's attempted blackmail of President Zelensky and the delay of sending funds and weapons to Ukraine until Zelenskyy would formally initiate an investigation into then candidate Joe Biden for "corruption" only emboldened Putin in his perception that the West was weak and divided.

One logical and most overly overlooked reason why Putin did not take any military action against Ukraine during Trump's presidency, is the simple fact that Putin has an ally in Trump in the White House, who was only too happy to denigrate and weaken NATO, repeat the Russian propaganda as to the origin of the conflict in Ukraine and generally offer a soft power type of support to Putin. Although in his typical manner, Trump says that nobody has ever been as tough as him on Russia, the credit for any action against Russia during his presidency should go to the governmental agencies and to Congress rather than to Trump himself.

Putin did not invade Ukraine when Trump was president because he already had what he wanted with Trump as president : (i) a weakening of NATO, (ii) the undermining of democracy and (iii) the undermining of US support to Zelenskyy.

The most significant event in consolidating the view of a weak and divided West, and in particular the US, was the January 6 attack on the Capitol. It is not possible to underestimate the impact this landmark event had on the image and on the perception of the United States abroad.

The victory of Biden in 2020 changed everything for Putin, who had lost an objective ally in the US. Most probably, his self-imposed isolation during Covid reinforced his delusion that both Ukraine and the West were weak and would neither be able to withstand a Russian invasion nor react vigorously against a fait accompli similarly to the previous aggressive moves of the Kremlin over the past ten years as described above.

The Russian dictator's objectives since 2007 have consistently been to carve out and impose a Russian sphere of influence to enhance and increase the natural right of Russia to be a domin-ant world power, fundamentally undermine NATO to render it inefficient and pointless and to maintain personal power in Russia.

With this in mind, it is essential to successfully engage a propaganda war with the help of a whole range of "useful idiots" in the West who are prepared to defend, push and try to impose theories blaming NATO for any and all conflict with Russia and to therefore undermine the principles of liberal democracy themselves.

Even in his wildest dreams, ensconced in his protective bubble in the Kremlin or one of his luxurious "dachas", I am sure that Putin would never have imagined that the most useful of all "useful idiots" would be the President of the United States.

Far from being the bane of world peace, NATO, under the impulse and determination of Joe Biden, is the bulwark defending democracy in Europe against the imperialistic and megalomaniac desires of Vladimir Putin. The 75th anniversary celebrations underway in the US are a worthy tribute to NATO. One can only hope that the American electorate will have the presence of mind and wisdom to ensure that NATO continues to play its pivotal role ensuring world peace rather than signing its death warrant by electing a "useful idiot" willing to do, yet once again, Putin's dirty work.